《国际组织》2023年第2期摘要翻译
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International Organization
国际组织
期刊介绍
《国际组织》是一份领先的同行评审期刊，涵盖了国际事务的整个领域。《国际组织》的文章提出了可推广的理论，提高了社会科学知识，并/或提供了关于构成国际关系和全球政治的广泛主题的新实证见解。
译者：于笑笑 烟台大学法学院本科生
初审：吴敏 山东师范大学法学院本科生
终审：陈嘉怡 暨南大学法学院/知识产权学院研究生
本
期
目
录
01. 殖民时期阿尔及利亚的战争与福利
War and Welfare in Colonial Algeria
02. 智慧来自哪里都受欢迎：斯堪的纳维亚半岛的战争、扩散和国家形成
Wisdom Is Welcome Wherever It Comes From: War, Diffusion, and State Formation in Scandinavia
03. 战争造就了国家：重新审视近代早期欧洲的贝利斯特范式
War Did Make States: Revisiting the Bellicist Paradigm in Early Modern Europe
04. 巨大的收入差异
The Great Revenue Divergence
05. 防务合作网络中的搭便车、网络效应与责任分担
Free Riding, Network Effects, and Burden Sharing in Defense Cooperation Networks
06. 无序的政治暴力：一个温度与暴乱的实证案例
Disorganized Political Violence: A Demonstration Case of Temperature and Insurgency
07. 国际发展组织的专项资金和控制-绩效权衡
Earmarked Funding and the Control–Performance Trade-Off in International Development Organizations
论
文
摘
要
01. 殖民时期阿尔及利亚的战争与福利
作者：
加布里埃尔·克勒-德里克（Gabriel Koehler-Derrick)，美国纽约大学阿布扎比分校社会科学系助理教授
梅丽莎·李（Melissa M. Lee)，美国宾夕法尼亚大学政治学系助理教授
摘要：
现代国家的一个显著特征是社会福利的广泛覆盖。这种显著的公共援助扩张存在巨大的空间和时间差异。如何解释这种社会福利的不均衡扩张？本文认为，社会福利的扩张，部分取决于被统治者迫使国家提供奖励以换取服兵役的能力。而最重要的是，边缘化群体在获得这些奖励方面面临更大的障碍。在殖民地国家，相对于居住在殖民地的公民而言，主体面临着讨价还价的劣势，并且不太可能因战时牺牲而赢得州的让步。本文使用双重差异研究设计以及第一次世界大战前后阿尔及利亚的本地支出的丰富数据集测试了这一论点。结果表明，社会福利支出在法国受试者中增长的幅度较小。本文通过强调被统治者在冲突后与国家讨价还价的差异能力，为国家建设的文献研究方面做出贡献。A distinguishing feature of the modern state is the broad scope of social welfare provision. This remarkable expansion of public assistance was characterized by huge spatial and temporal disparities. What explains the uneven expansion in the reach of social welfare? We argue that social welfare expansion depends in part on the ability of the governed to compel the state to provide rewards in return for military serviceand crucially, that marginalized groups faced greater barriers to obtaining those rewards. In colonial states, subjects faced a bargaining disadvantage relative to citizens living in the colony and were less likely to win concessions from the state for their wartime sacrifices. We test this argument using a difference-in-differences research design and a rich data set of local spending before and after World War I in colonial Algeria. Our results reveal that social welfare spending expanded less in communes where the French subject share of the population was greater. This paper contributes to the state-building literature by highlighting the differential ability of the governed to bargain with the state in the aftermath of conflict.02. 智慧来自哪里都受欢迎：斯堪的纳维亚半岛的战争、扩散和国家形成
作者：
埃里克·格里纳维斯基（Eric Grynaviski），美国华盛顿特区乔治华盛顿大学政治学和国际事务副教授
斯维里·斯坦森 (Sverrir Steinsson) ，美国乔治华盛顿大学政治学系博士生
摘要：
著名的国家形成理论认为，国家的形成一方面是因为战争和竞争，另一方面是通过学习和模仿传播组织模板和实践。本文提出，这两条理论可以联系起来，更准确地解释状态形成的机制。本文认为，战争是社会扩散的重要来源。战争建立了政治精英之间的跨境联系，产生了移民潮，并建立了新的经济网络。本文通过对维京时代初期至中世纪晚期（公元800-1300年）北欧政治单位的比较案例研究来检验该理论的有效性，发现挪威和丹麦统治者在欧洲最先进的王国英格兰的突袭、定居和征服，启动了挪威和丹麦的国家形成过程。在这些情况下，胜利者模仿失败者。Prominent theories of state formation hold that states formed because of warfare and competition on the one hand, or the diffusion of organizational templates and practices through learning and emulation on the other. We propose that the two strands of theory can be linked to more accurately account for mechanisms of state formation. War, we argue, is an important source of social diffusion. War establishes contacts between political elites across borders, generates migratory flows, and establishes new economic networks. We examine the validity of the theory through a comparative case study of Nordic political units from the dawn of the Viking Age to the end of the High Middle Ages (CE 800–1300), finding that raids, settlements, and conquests by Norwegian and Danish rulers in England, Europe's most advanced kingdom, set in motion state formation processes in Norway and Denmark. In these cases, the winners emulated the losers.03. 战争造就了国家：重新审视近代早期欧洲的贝利斯特范式
作者：
拉尔斯·埃里克·塞德曼 (Lars-Erik Cederman) ，苏黎世联邦理工学院国际冲突研究教授
保拉·加拉诺·托罗（Paola Galano Toro)，苏黎世联邦理工学院国际冲突研究小组博士生
吕克·吉拉丁（Luc Girardin)，苏黎世联邦理工学院国际冲突研究教授
盖伊·施维茨（Guy Schvitz)，欧盟委员会联合研究中心项目官员
摘要：
查尔斯·蒂利关于现代早期欧洲“战争造就的国家”的经典说法仍然存在争议。“好战主义”范式在其最初的适用范围内外都受到了理论批评。虽然最近的几项研究分析了蒂利理论的内部方面，但很少有系统的尝试来评估其关于国家领土扩张的逻辑。在本文中，通过将欧洲国家边界的历史数据与冲突数据进行比对，直接检验了好战主义理论的这一关键方面，重点是1490年至1790年。从系统、国家和二元层面来看，本文的分析证实，在法国大革命之前（以及之后），战争确实在欧洲国家的领土扩张中发挥了至关重要的作用。Charles Tilly's classical claim that “war made states” in early modern Europe remains controversial. The “bellicist” paradigm has attracted theoretical criticism both within and beyond its original domain of applicability. While several recent studies have analyzed the internal aspects of Tilly's theory, there have been very few systematic attempts to assess its logic with regard to the territorial expansion of states. In this paper, we test this key aspect of bellicist theory directly by aligning historical data on European state borders with conflict data, focusing on the period from 1490 through 1790. Proceeding at the systemic, state, and dyadic levels, our analysis confirms that warfare did in fact play a crucial role in the territorial expansion of European states before (and beyond) the French Revolution.04. 巨大的收入差异
作者：
亚历山大·李（Alexander Lee)，美国罗切斯特大学艺术与科学学院政治学系助理教授
杰克·潘恩（Jack Paine)，美国罗彻斯特大学艺术与科学学院政治学助理教授
摘要：
本文描述并解释了以前被忽视的国家税收经验模式。直到1913年，西方中央政府的人均收入水平与世界其他地区相似，尽管统治着更富裕的社会，并经历了悠久的财政创新历史。西方的收入水平在接下来的半个世纪里才出现永久性的分化。本文通过构建具有广泛空间和时间覆盖范围的中央政府收入面板数据集来确定二十世纪的巨大收入差异。为了解释这种模式，本文认为，可持续的高水平收入提取需要社会对激进国家的需求，以及有效的官僚机构的供应。孤立的任何一个因素都是不够的。本文将这种见解形式化为博弈论模型。政府可以选择低工作量、易读性和裙带偏好的策略来增加收入。从经验上讲，本文的理论解释了低需求时期（十九世纪的西方）或低官僚能力（二十世纪的前殖民地）的低收入摄入，以及西方最终的收入高峰。This article describes and explains a previously overlooked empirical pattern in state revenue collection. As late as 1913, central governments in the West collected similar levels of per capita revenue as the rest of the world, despite ruling richer societies and experiencing a long history of fiscal innovation. Western revenue levels permanently diverged only in the following half-century. We identify the twentieth-century great revenue divergence by constructing a new panel data set of central government revenue with broad spatial and temporal coverage. To explain the pattern, we argue that sustainably high levels of revenue extraction require societal demand for an activist state, and a supply of effective bureaucratic institutions. Neither factor in isolation is sufficient. We formalize this insight in a game-theoretic model. The government can choose among low-effort, legibility-intensive, and crony-favoring strategies for raising revenues. Empirically, our theory accounts for low revenue intake in periods of low demand (the nineteenth-century West) or low bureaucratic capacity (twentieth-century former colonies), and for eventual revenue spikes in the West.05.防务合作网络中的搭便车、网络效应与责任分担
作者：
布兰登·金尼（Brandon J. Kinne)，美国加州大学戴维斯分校政治学系教授
凯瑟琳·布罗尔曼（Stephanie N. Kang)，美国加州大学戴维斯分校政治学系副教授
摘要：
各州如何分配集体防御的负担？本文探讨了负担共享的网络理论。本文专注于双边国防合作协议，这些协议促进了各种国防，军事和安全问题领域的合作。计算模型表明双边国防合作协议合作伙伴的防御支出取决于其协议的网络结构。从双边角度来看，国防授权机构通过让各国致力于国防活动并允许合作伙伴相互惩罚搭便车，来增加国防开支。但是，随着州的本地国防伙伴关系网络越来越密切，与许多及时的“朋友的朋友”关系相关，国防合作协议具有减少国防支出的反击效应。在双边防御网络中，越深的综合状态越多，他们在国防上的支出就越少。本文将这种效果背后的两个潜在机制区分开来——一种基于提高效率，另一种是基于搭便车的。使用多级推论网络模型的经验分析要多于效率，而不是搭便车。国防网络降低了国防支出，并通过允许各国更有效地生产安全性来做到这一点。
How do states distribute the burdens of collective defense? This paper develops a network theory of burden sharing. We focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote cooperation in a variety of defense, military, and security issue areas. Using a computational model, we show that DCA partners’ defense spending depends on the network structure of their agreements. In bilateral terms, DCAs increase defense spending by committing states to defense activities and allowing partners to reciprocally punish free riding. However, as a state’s local network of defense partnerships grows more densely connected, with many transitive “friend of a friend” relations, DCAs have the countervailing effect of reducing defense spending. The more deeply integrated states are in bilateral defense networks, the less they spend on defense. We distinguish two potential mechanisms behind this effect—one based on efficiency improvements, the other on free riding. An empirical analysis using multilevel inferential network models points more to efficiency than to free riding. Defense networks reduce defense spending, and they do so by allowing countries to produce security more efficiently.
06. 无序的政治暴力：一个温度与暴乱的实证案例
作者：
安德鲁·沙弗（Andrew Shaver），美国加州大学默塞德分校政治学系助理教授
亚历山大·布拉斯（Alexander K. Bollfrass)，苏黎世联邦理工学院安全研究中心高级研究员
摘要：
战场暴力行为的任何行为都来自组织战略和战斗人员的个人动机的结合。为了衡量每个人的相对贡献，本文的研究利用了环境温度对人类攻击的可预测影响。利用美军在阿富汗和伊拉克冲突期间收集的细粒度数据，本文测试温度和暴力是否与单个战斗人员发起的攻击有关，但对于需要组织协调的攻击则不然。为了区分涉及温度对目标运动影响的替代解释，本文检查了目标是固定的情况。本文发现，当各个战斗人员对暴力的启动有酌处权时，环境温度确实会塑造战场的结果。当需要组织协调时，没有这种影响。本文还发现，在伊拉克冲突期间进行的一项调查中，环境温度会影响战斗年龄男性对叛乱暴力的认可。本文的调查结果警告不要将战略原因归因于暴力，并鼓励研究战略和个人水平动机如何在冲突中相互作用。Any act of battlefield violence results from a combination of organizational strategy and a combatant’s personal motives. To measure the relative contribution of each, our research design leverages the predictable effect of ambient temperature on human aggression. Using fine-grained data collected by US forces during the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, we test whether temperature and violence are linked for attacks that can be initiated by individual combatants, but not for those requiring organizational coordination. To distinguish alternative explanations involving temperature effects on target movements, we examine situations where targets are stationary. We find that when individual combatants have discretion over the initiation of violence, ambient temperature does shape battlefield outcomes. There is no such effect when organizational coordination is necessary. We also find that ambient temperature affects combat-age males’ endorsement of insurgent violence in a survey taken during the conflict in Iraq. Our findings caution against attributing strategic causes to violence and encourage research into how strategic and individual-level motivations interact in conflict.07. 国际发展组织的专项资金和控制-绩效权衡
作者：
米尔科·海因泽尔（Mirko Heinzel），英国格拉斯哥大学政治与社会科学学院助理教授
本·科米尔（Ben Cormier)，英国思克莱德大学政府和公共政策学院助理教授
伯恩哈德·雷因斯伯格（Bernhard Reinsberg)，英国格拉斯哥大学政治与社会科学学院助理教授
摘要：
自1990年代以来，多边发展援助的资金迅速转变。捐助者越来越多地通过指定的资金来限制国际发展组织的酌处权，这限制了可以使用捐助者资金的目的。这种发展对国际发展组织的运营绩效的后果不足以理解。本文假设，由于专门资金的资金，行政负担的增加降低了国际发展组织项目的绩效。指定资金要求国际发展组织所需的其他报告，虽然旨在提高问责制，但最终提高了国际发展组织的监督成本并削弱了其绩效。本文首先使用普通最低方案和仪器变量分析的数据来检验这些假设，并提供有关项目成本和世界银行项目的性能的数据。然后，通过将分析扩展到其他四个国际发展组织：非洲发展银行，亚洲发展银行，加勒比海发展银行和国际农业发展基金，从而探究了这些发现对其他组织的普遍性。利用1990年至2020年之间批准的7,571个项目的绩效数据，本文发现专门的资金破坏了整个国际发展组织的成本效益和项目绩效。寻求价值的捐助者可能会认为将更多的钱分配给核心资金，而不是指定资金。Since the 1990s, the funding of multilateral development assistance has rapidly transformed. Donors increasingly constrain the discretion of international development organizations (IDOs) through earmarked funding, which limits the purposes for which a donor’s funds can be used. The consequences of this development for IDOs’ operational performance are insufficiently understood. We hypothesize that increases in administrative burdens due to earmarked funding reduce the performance of IDO projects. The additional reporting required of IDOs by earmarked funds, while designed to enhance accountability, ultimately increases IDOs’ supervision costs and weakens their performance. We first test these hypotheses with data on project costs and performance of World Bank projects using both ordinary-least-squares and instrumental-variable analyses. We then probe the generalizability of those findings to other organizations by extending our analysis to four other IDOs: the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Using data on the performance of 7,571 projects approved between 1990 and 2020, we find that earmarked funding undermines both cost-effectiveness and project performance across IDOs. Donors seeking value for money may consider allocating more money to core funds rather than to earmarked funds.感谢观看 欢迎关注
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图文编辑 | 余振宇 宁波大学法学院本科生
审校 | 徐奇 暨南大学法学院/知识产权学院副教授
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